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Abstract 
The 12010 e-Government Action Plan from the 
European Union forces Public Administrations (national, 
regional and local) of all Member States that by 2010 to 
meet all administrative acts of the citizens through the 
Internet. This implies the need for mechanisms and 
systems to be able to unequivocally identify people on the 
Internet, together with a reliable system of interoperable 
electronic identification management (eIDM), in such a 
way that citizens, businesses and government departments 
(even in different Member States) can identify themselves 
and certify their transactions accurately, quickly and 
simply. 
However, despite the clear advantages that this entails 
for EU citizens, namely thefact that they possess a digital 
identity which allows them secure and identified access to 
the services offered by the various public administrations 
in Member States, the implementation of a solution ofthis 
kind involves a series of risks which, if they are not duly 
dealt with, may engender a reduction in the effectiveness 
of public institutions and citizens' trust in them. This 
article will analyse the problems associated with digital 
identity in the EU framework and the extent to which the 
solutions adopted to date meet the constitutional 
requirements, or fail to, highlighting aspects which may 
entail a risk or detriment to the freedoms of citizens and 
those relating to the handling of digital identity which 
have not yet been tackled but which, given their particular 
relevance, necessitate an immediate solution. 
1. Introduction 
In 2006, the European Union launched its Í2010 
e-Government Action Plan [1], aiming to modernize the 
public services of Member States and to make them more 
effective, offering secure services to reduce the 
administrative burden and inefficiency with which 
citizens today are faced. Within this concept of 
modernization and improvement, a fundamental 
requirement is that of cross-border continuity of public 
services, so that transactions involving public 
administrations of different states may be carried out. 
As an immediate consequence of the application of this 
Plan, we find that governments (at local, regional and 
national level) of all member states are obliged to handle 
all citizens' administrative needs via the Internet, by a 
rapidly approaching deadline. This involves implementing 
a series of additional measures, both at national and 
international level which, through their direct impact on 
citizens, highlight the need for people to have a digital 
identity which allows them to prove their identity 
unequivocally when carrying out operations online. 
In this article we will use the definitions of identity and 
digital identity of an entity, found in [2], understanding 
that a citizen is an entity that must be identified within a 
Communications infrastructure. The afore-mentioned 
document states that an entity, and therefore a citizen, has 
one unique identity which consists of a determined set of 
attributes that do not necessarily need to be unique to said 
entity, but which are useful in that, as a whole, they 
enable this entity to be distinguished from another. A 
digital identity is, by definition, a subset (or partial 
identity) of the identity of an entity expressed in 
electronic format and may be considered as the entity's 
representation on the net. In accordance with this 
definition, a given entity will have múltiple digital 
identities, which may be unique or otherwise. 
In order to identify their citizens, some European 
countries have traditionally used systems based on 
showing a document issued by the State proving their 
identity (national ID card). This document has evolved 
over time, from a simple sheet of paper with a set of 
personal information, certified by an official authority, to 
the most recent identity documents. The contení of these 
is virtually similar in all countries, and they are equipped 
with strong anti-counterfeit measures such as a 
photograph, signature and fingerprint, which allow for 
biometric, and presumably, more reliable identification of 
the owner. 
Both in countries which already have traditional 
identification systems and in those which don't, citizens 
will need an electronic or digital identity which allows 
them to identify themselves on the net, with at least the 
same guarantees as those who do so with their national ID 
card in inter-personal interactions. To this end, the 
majority of countries in the European Union are rolling 
out infrastructure which will allow all citizens to be sent 
electronic identification cards known as eID cards, within 
a reasonable period of time. Their external appearance 
will be very similar to that of traditional identification 
documents, but with the safeguard that they include a chip 
storing information on the citizen's identity. These eID 
cards are already being sent out in Austria, Belgium, 
Estonia, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and Spain. 
However, in other countries like Sweden or Denmark 
having an ID card is not compulsory, they use electronic 
identities that are only valid in the net. 
The Í2010 Plan does not currently consider that 
traditional identity cards must evolve towards eID cards, 
as the first cards designed to be used in public services 
were related to the security of the State, for example, to 
facilítate border control, whereas electronic identification 
seeks to facilítate access to public services as well as to 
provide personalised services. However, countries such as 
Spain have opted to combine the functions of both types 
of card in one single document, so that the current identity 
cards (13 million copies of which have already been sent 
out at the end of 2009,) combine citizens' personal and 
biometric data together with their digital identity (secret 
and certified prívate key). 
Notwithstanding the advantages that possessing a 
digital identity undoubtedly entails for EU citizens, 
allowing them secure and identified access to services 
provided by the different public administrations of 
member states, the implementation of this solution is not 
free from risks which, if they are not duly tackled, could 
impair the effectiveness of State institutions and the trust 
of citizens therein. 
This article will analyse the problems associated with 
digital identity in the EU framework, and will consider 
the extent to which the solutions adopted to date meet the 
constitutional requirements, highlighting aspects which 
may entail a risk or detríment to the freedoms of citizens 
and those relating to the treatment of digital identity 
which have not yet been tackled but which, given their 
particular relevance, require an immediate solution. 
2. Problems associated with digital identity in 
the EU framework 
This section will identify the risks which may arise 
when rolling out the electronic identity system, together 
with the main problems which must be solved in order to 
achieve effective pan-European communication between 
all levéis of government. 
This article will not discuss the risks inherent to any 
process of registration and authentication, given the fact 
that malicious elements may make undue use of a 
citizen's credentials (and thus obtain their electronic 
identity), or they may take over their electronic identity 
and therefore, from the point of view of the internet, take 
on their real identity. Any of these circumstances may 
cause significant harm, including the loss of integrity and 
confidentiality of information and the loss of availability 
and function of a service, thereby entailing risks of 
financial loss for institutions and citizens and even risks 
to their personal safety. 
Due to the significance of this problem, great effort has 
been made for some years now to ensure that the process 
of registering citizens with the Registry Authorities is 
imbued with máximum guarantees of security, forcing 
these Authorities to carry out exhaustive checks on the 
credentials presented and obliging them to maintain strict 
internal security measures. Likewise, Certification 
Authorities, which are also equipped with strong internal 
security measures, are required to maintain a constantly-
updated record of the state of citizens' identities (valid, 
revoked and expired), as well as providing mechanisms so 
that citizens can easily revoke a digital identity that they 
believe to have been compromised. 
As such, perhaps the aspect needing to be strengthened 
concerns citizens, as they must be aware of the risks 
involved in possessing a digital identity and the need to 
protect it at all times. A detailed study of the risks 
involved in the registration and authentication processes, 
their potential impact on institutions and citizens and the 
probabilities of occurrence can be found in [3]. 
2.1. The problem of identity management based 
on certificates 
Another important challenge which digital 
identification systems must tackle is cross-border 
continuity of public services; namely, that a citizen not 
come up against barriers which are difficult, or even 
impossible to cross, in order to access public services 
offered by different countries. For example, today a 
Spanish citizen can work for a Germán company and 
carry out their professional activity in Belgium, 
theoretically without any kind of red tape. However, in 
this multi-national environment, when the worker wishes 
to access the services offered by the Germán Public 
Administration with their national ID card issued in 
Spain, or to consult information on work-related aspects 
within the Belgian Public Administration, problems arise 
due to the need to prove the citizen's identity by means of 
a certifícate issued by an entity in a different country to 
where the service is being requested. 
Nowadays certificates are usually based on the X.509 
standard and they contain almost the same data. However 
there are many problems, for example, there is not a top 
level Certification Authority that would enable revocation 
checks or certifícate path validation. The existence of this 
Authority, would undoubtedly help to resolve many of the 
current problems, but poses enormous political and legal 
difficulties for its management, henee currently solutions 
are oriented towards achieving interoperability among 
existing identity systems at a pan-European level. 
Generically, owing to the diversity of identity 
management systems, when the user of a given system -
whether a citizen, an enterprise or the government itself -
seeks to communicate with governments outside the 
scope of his or her own local identity management 
system, management systems must be linked to each other 
and understand each other so that the identity of the user 
of one system can be understood and accepted by the 
other system. 
It is therefore necessary to establish an interoperability 
framework at the European Union level for identity 
management systems. It should include the specification 
and development of a set of technical and organizational 
infrastructures that could define, administer and manage 
attributes related to the identity of individuáis. These 
infrastructures are called Identity Management Systems or 
IDMs and it is expected that their use at European Union 
level will be available in a short period of time due to the 
restrictions and simplifications derived from the 
environment where they are going to be applied, the 
Public Administration. In this environment is feasible to 
consider that involved entities are trustworthy, so they 
will not act badly or fraudulently. 
In order to successfully establish the interoperability 
framework, European Union has drawn up a roadmap [4]. 
In this roadmap, a series of design principies will be laid 
out, based around the fundamental principie of 
subsidiarity, namely, each Member State must maintain 
its autonomy and responsibility to continué its Identity 
Management Systems initiatives. These principies give 
rise to a series of criteria for a pan-European Identity 
Management System: 
• Federated. There must be mutual trust between the 
different governments regarding the methods of 
identification and authentication. 
• Multi-level. In the sense that it must allow Member 
states to provide múltiple levéis of security for 
identity management services. The requirements for 
authentication for each service must be adapted to the 
security need of said service, which involves the pan-
European definition of a set of criteria for each level 
of authentication. 
• Depending on reliable sources. To guarantee the 
quality of information, in each Member state there 
must be one single reliable source for each piece of 
information corresponding to a registered entity, so 
that data duplication is avoided and one single correct 
and official source is ensured. 
• Allow the private sector to be incorporated in 
member states where private companies are trusted, 
for example financial institutions, in order to provide 
electronic identity management services. 
We can therefore deduce from this that identity 
federation refers to a shared effort to achieve the 
interoperability of Identity Management Systems that are 
present in different environments. In this way information 
on a user's identity, possibly spread across different áreas, 
may be brought together so that the user can be identified 
in one environment and can have access to others. As 
such, the different service providers can access the user' s 
information in the different environments. 
The identity federation extends the use of a user's 
digital identity, so that it goes from being something 
internal for a service provider, to being shared with 
several providers. This change prompts the appearance of 
complicated management processes related to the way in 
which identity is registered, revoked and modified within 
an identity provider, thereby engendering greater security 
risks for the Identity Federation [5]. 
On the basis of action plans launched by the European 
Union, in recent years a number of initiatives have 
focused on achieving pan-European interoperability 
between identity management systems [6] [7] [8] [9]. 
Basically, all these initiatives culminate in the proposed 
creation of security infrastructure based on a federated 
model. These models rely on a series of identity portáis in 
each Member State responsible for authenticating entities 
at a national level and deciding the trust level granted to 
authentication processes in another Member State, so that 
each State will accept as equivalents the authentication 
levéis and mechanisms used in another State on the basis 
of a set of criteria, while no specific pan-European 
infrastructure would be required. In this way it can 
sepárate provisión of the service from processes related to 
digital identity that are necessary to provide said service -
Le., user registration, generation and storage of identity 
and authentication data. 
With respect to outstanding problems that require a 
solution, that of trust is perhaps the most important. The 
heterogeneity of existing systems and the mechanisms of 
authentication and authorization operating in different 
countries makes it crucial to equip a pan-European system 
with the capacity to map identity tokens delivered by the 
identity management system of one country to its 
counterparts in another country, if the objective is to make 
access to services as transparent as possible to the public 
and users in general. This means that the system must 
necessarily be multi-level. The fact that the system is 
multi-level also facilitates, a priori, the incorporation of 
all countries with digital identity and an identity 
management system, thus speeding up the implementation 
of the system. 
Another issue to be solved is semantic interoperability, 
which is closely linked to multilevel operability. 
Incorporation within a pan-European system of solutions 
that have already been implemented at a national level 
demands translation between representation formats at 
interconnection points, which also implies a need to 
establish a certain degree of semantic interoperability. 
Despite the existence of the roadmap, the design 
principies and the afore-mentioned criteria, we can 
confirm that in practice, interoperability between identity 
management systems in various European countries 
continúes to be an ambition rather than reality, although 
solutions are being proposed. 
2.2. Problems of electronic signatures 
In addition to the problems of interoperability between 
different identity management systems discussed above, 
there are other interoperability problems that have a 
greater impact and therefore must be considered, 
specifically speaking, and the problem of interoperability 
of electronic signatures. This problem arises because 
current European legislation allows for anybody 
possessing an eID to use it to sign any piece of 
information going to a recipient who may be located in a 
different EU country. This means that the entity receiving 
a signed document must be able to verify the signature, 
irrespective of the eID used by the signing entity. 
The interoperability challenges are thus best described 
from the viewpoint of the receiver of a digitally signed 
piece of information, because it must check all signatures, 
handling the relevant signature formats including all 
necessary modes (enveloped, enveloping, and 
independent) for múltiple signatures, all necessary hash 
and crypto algorithms and the eIDs of all signers. 
Although the technical validation of signatures has its 
challenges with respect to scaling, the real problem to 
receiver party is the assessment of the risk implied by 
accepting the signature, determined by the legal situation, 
the quality of the cryptography used, the liability 
situation, and the trustworthiness of the Certification 
Authority. With the objective of solving these problems, 
the European project PEPPOL [10] is developing 
guidelines, specifications and pilot solutions to overeóme 
the lack of interoperability between national schemes for 
electronically signing tender documents, which gives rise 
to the hope that these problems will disappear and the 
process of signature verification can be carried out with 
full guarantees. 
2.3. Protection of personal data 
Throughout a large part of history, identity has been 
understood from the legal point of view, as solely a tool to 
validate the subject of the rights, obligations and 
punishments or penalties should they fail to comply with 
the law. Only with constitutional recognition of individual 
freedoms enshrined in the first constitutions, did identity 
also become an expression of individual freedom. In fact, 
it wasn't until the beginning of the 19th century that 
identity as an aspect of personality began to be recognised 
by legislation as something capable of adequately 
expressing the individual personality and people's 
freedoms. 
Currently, a natural person's identity is not 
systematically regulated by legislation. There are a set of 
definitions which do not always concur and which have 
two fundamental functions: i) Allowing identification for 
legal ends; ii) Protecting individual rights and freedoms 
related to a natural person. As regards regulation, it may 
be said that personal identity is regulated at different 
levéis, as it is dealt with in national constitutions, in the 
European Union treaty, in private legislations of each 
nation, in administrative legislation and is furthermore 
protected against non-authorised use and access by third 
parties, through criminal law. 
Generically speaking, we can say that a method of 
identification which allows an individual to be 
distinguished from all others, must, from a legal 
perspective, comply with two fundamental rules: 
• Show sufficient information to guarantee the highest 
level of security possible when it comes to 
differentiating between one individual and others. 
• Not reveal information which corresponds to the 
private level of the individual to be identified. 
Normally, and to comply with this, each legal system 
avails of a store of information within their identification 
documents, which usually corresponds to a biometric 
image of one or several parts of the body of the subject to 
be identified. This is true for Spanish identity cards. In 
some countries such as Austria or the United Kingdom, it 
is not compulsory to carry any kind of identification 
document, unlike in other countries such as Spain, Italy or 
Germany, where this is compulsory. 
On the other hand, specific information such as civil 
status or profession, typically held by Public 
Administrations, is considered to be superfluous in 
current legislation on personal identification, basically 
because it is too closely linked to the individual's private 
sphere. The current publie interest in ever-more specific 
identification must give way before the individual's rights 
and freedoms. In the more democratic legal systems, 
legislation has made clear moves towards identification 
systems which, while being less precise, are also less 
intrusive than traditional systems. The principie that 
official identification should show no information relating 
to the private life of the subject to be identified can 
currently be considered as a widely accepted rule. 
With the aim of building citizens' trust in electronic 
identification systems and of unifying legislation, the 
European Directive 95/46/CE was established, on data 
protection [11]. The target of this is to grant the subject as 
great a control as possible over their identity and personal 
data, putting forward a series of requirements to be met 
by recipients, controllers, processors and third parties 
when processing this information. In this context, 
personal data is understood to mean "any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person; an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly 
or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity". 
Thus, among the principies established by this 
Directive, the following should be highlighted: 
• Personal data must be adequately processed and must 
fully comply with provisions in the law, it must be 
recognised with explicit and legitímate ends, be 
relevant and adequate to these ends (never excessive) 
and be used in accordance with them. This principie 
extends to cooperation between governments which 
is needed to collect specific data from a specific 
citizen, which will entail that a government request 
this data from another government, on behalf of or 
representing this citizen. 
• Data identifying an individual should not be retained 
longer than necessary and individuáis must be 
provided with means of control, to rectify, delete or 
block access to their personal data, furthermore 
adopting appropriate measures, from both technical 
and organisational perspectives, to prevent non-
authorised access to or illegitimate use of data. 
• Personal data must not be transferred to a country or 
territory outside the European Economic Área unless 
that country or territory ensures an adequate level of 
protection for said data. 
However, despite the existence of these principies 
which are applicable to personal data, there is much 
reluctance towards the possibility of including additional 
information on the holder in electronic identification 
cards, thereby giving the State greater control over the 
citizen (for example including information on their 
political ideology, religious beliefs, socially rejected 
diseases or allowing their movements to be traced). This 
fear is even greater when, such as in Spain's case, one 
single document includes all information required for 
authentication, both in services relating to security of the 
state and in those relating to interaction between the 
citizen and the Government. Therefore, one of the 
challenges to those facing digital identification systems is 
that of giving them máximum transparency, so that 
citizens harbour no suspicions on the nature of the 
personal data borne by the card that they carry. 
2.4. Identity Delegation 
The problem of identifying citizens in a pan-European 
environment is not the only one. There are other problems 
related to the different legal frameworks and different 
ways identity is used in each country. Of these problems, 
the most significant and most relevant one, owing both to 
its complexity and the fact that it is in demand from the 
public, is identity delegation. Present law in many 
Member States of the EU allows for delegation to another 
party in dealings with public institutions. For example, in 
Spain, one person can authorize another person, 
commonly a specialized management agency, to perform 
all transactions related to filing tax returns with the 
government. Thus, a person can have different roles 
simultaneously in an identity management system: one 
can be both an individual and the legal representative of 
an enterprise or organization. The identity management 
systems proposed to date have made very little progress in 
these issues and none provides support for role 
management and delegation. 
The concept of identity delegation is defined [2] as the 
process in which an identified entity issues a mándate to 
another identified entity. On the basis of this definition, 
we can see that the act of delegating is a cession by a 
person or entity of part of its rights to another in order to 
enable the latter to act on behalf of the former before a 
third party. In terms of citizens and public institutions, 
delegation basically involves one citizen granting another 
citizen authorization or a mándate that the latter can use, 
in the ñame of the former, to access services provided by 
institutions. 
According to [12] at least three parties are in volved in 
the process of delegation: the delegator, the delegatee and 
the service provider. The delegator is a person or entity 
that shares, by means of what is usually called a 
delegation assertion, one or more of its privileges in 
accessing a service with another person or entity. The 
delegatee is the person who receives the privileges of the 
delegator, that is, the delegation assertion, and the service 
provider is the party which, as its own ñame indicates, 
provides certain services on demand to the delegatee after 
the delegation assertion has been presented. In addition to 
these generic entities, and depending on the delegation 
process used, other entities may emerge, such as the 
identity provider or delegation authorities. 
Taking this set of basic entities as a point of departure, 
[13] presents a classification of delegation in two 
elementary models: the model of direct delegation and the 
model of indirect delegation. Direct delegation is when 
the delegator delegates all or a subset of his or her 
privileges to the delegatee, who makes use of them to 
access a service (Fig. 1). The same process applies in 
indirect delegation, but through a series of intermedíate 





Figure 1 - Model of direct delegation 
f \^ Delegation Assertion f N, Delegation Assertion f >. 
( Delegator ] ~ ~* f Delegatee^ - —> / D e l é g a t e ^ 
\. J «- Response "<J* Response \U'" 
Delegation Assertion 
Delegatee \ * / Service 
n
 /
 D 4 í « « M \ Provider 
4-
Response 
Figure 2 - Model of indirect delegation 
We would highlight a series of aspects of delegation 
that were mentioned in [13]. The first is that delegation 
does not mean authorization. That is, even if a service 
provider accepts the delegation, it need not accept the 
privileges requested by the delegatee. It is always at the 
discretion of the service provider whether or not to accept 
the request made by the delegatee. Secondly, the 
delegation assertion must always prove consent on the 
part of the delegator, as the latter may impose certain 
conditions on the act of delegation such as a period of 
validity or permission to engage in indirect delegation. 
Finally, any solution must always seek to preserve the 
privacy of the delegator. 
To date, and despite being one of the aspects that 
citizens request when accessing services, identity 
management systems which are being rolled out across 
different EU member countries do not contémplate the 
possibility of delegation, basically due to the technical 
and legal difficulties involved. No technical solution has 
been proposed which would enable a shared and 
interoperable identity delegation model facilitating 
delegation mechanisms which a citizen from a specific 
country could use, for example granting a representative 
of another country access to and interaction with 
determined public services. As such, there is no specific 
legislation at European level regulating delegation in such 
important aspects as who may delégate, who they may 
delégate to, for which services delegation may occur or 
how many levéis of delegation are allowed in case the use 
of indirect delegation is enabled. 
3. Conclusions 
Movement of citizens of member countries within the 
European Union for work or for study are becoming 
increasingly commonplace, and everything would seem to 
indicate that this trend will increase as cooperation 
between countries in the EU extends and the number of 
European-wide projects and initiatives grows. On the 
other hand, it is foreseeable that the number of people 
who travel within Europe for personal reasons will also 
rise, for example, the case of retired people who change 
their place of residence because they would prefer to live 
in peaceful áreas but who wish to keep their nationality of 
origin. 
Due to the increasing movement of citizens, and with 
the aim of meeting the new needs of these people, the 
exchange of information between governments of 
different European countries will also expand. As such, 
the forms and mechanisms used by citizens to deal with 
their local, regional, national and supranational 
governments will vary, so that the operations can be 
carried out remotely. 
The gradual but definite distribution of electronic 
identities promoted by Public Administrations provides 
essential elements for the implementation of electronic 
Identity Management systems (eIDMs) which will permit 
this type of interaction, but there are still technical, social 
and legal problems arising from the use of these systems 
and their interoperability. The level of acceptance of 
identification systems is far from equal in all European 
Union member states and the legislation and standards are 
not uniform, thereby prompting significant doubts among 
citizens as to the convenience or otherwise, of the use of 
this type of system. This matter is especially relevant 
when considering citizens' privacy and data protection, 
where the citizen may feel a loss of control over their 
privacy. Likewise, there are other aspects such as identity 
delegation which are currently included in national 
legislation, which must be echoed in digital authentication 
systems and in pan-European legislation. 
On the other hand, the initial use of electronic 
identities in the environment of Public Administration 
simplifies the problems that can arise and make the 
solutions feasible in the short term. 
The authors of this paper are of the opinión that, 
despite the issues listed throughout this article, European 
interoperability will become a reality as these problems 
are solved and as digital identification systems gain 
people's trust. 
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